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ABSTRACT 
This research was conducted in response to a request by the Navy Manpower Analysis 
Center.  The research examined the Preventive Maintenance to Corrective Maintenance 
Ratio (PM:CM) as part of the Ship Manpower Document (SMD) requirements 
development process.  Established in 1968, the PM:CM ratio has never been revised. 
Previous research indicates that the PM:CM ratio used by NAVMAC underestimates 
actual CM performed on board ships.  
The research examined the 1:1 (electrical) and 2:1 (mechanical) ratios used to 
accurately forecast CM.  The study analyzes effects to the SMD when actual Open 
Architectural Retrieval System (OARS) CM data is used.  This study used one 
Engineering and one Combat Systems work center as a baseline.  CM OARS data for the 
work centers was provided by NAVSEA and PM data was provided by NAVMAC.  
Findings indicate that across all DDG [flights], the PM:CM ratio understates the 
amount of CM performed.  The resulting ratio for electrical maintenance was 1:10.9 and 
for mechanical maintenance 1:1.64.  When CM from OARS was used to determine SMD 
requirements as outlined in OPNAVINST 1000.16K, it resulted in increased functional 
work on all flights of DDGs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
The goal of this research was to evaluate the corrective maintenance in Open 
Architecture Retrieval System (OARS) for U.S. Navy Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) 
class ships.  The analysis examines the accuracy of the corrective/preventive maintenance 
ratio currently used to determine Navy Manpower requirements.  Research included 
conducting a detailed analysis of OARS maintenance data of the DDG-51 class, a review 
of current ship board maintenance instructions, and analysis of the current Preventive 
Maintenance: Corrective Maintenance (PM:CM) ratio. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Question 
1. Does the current corrective maintenance in the SMD represent actual work 
as reported in the NAVSEA Open Architectural Retrieval System (OARS) 
database? 
Secondary Question 
1. How does maintenance workload affect manpower requirements? 
C. DISCUSSION 
Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) determines wartime requirements 
based on a notional 60-day at-sea, wartime scenario as defined by the Required 
Operational Capability/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE).  During this 
time, all PM:CM workload is tracked separately from PM:CM workload completed in 
and around CONUS.  During wartime, only essential CM that will maintain equipment in 
optimal wartime readiness status is be performed.  One output factor is that CM 
performed during deployments may be substantially less than when the ship is in port. 
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Since the inception of the Surface Ship Maintenance Effectiveness Review 
(SURFMER), PM has decreased on Navy ships by 40 percent (Olinger, 2002, p. 2).  The 
reduction in PM has caused a corresponding reduction in CM.  In maintenance intensive 
departments such as Deck and Engineering, this can equate to substantial manpower 
reductions.  The PM:CM ratio is one of the variables used in formulating manning 
requirements.  As with all systems relying on human data recording routines, insufficient 
and/or inaccurate input degrades results and performance. 
D. SCOPE 
The scope and direction of this study included the following:  a review of OARS 
corrective maintenance for 51 DDG type ships for a deployment lasting more than 60 
days between 2008 and 2010 and a PM:CM ratio was generated using NAVMAC’s 
established ratio formula and guidance from OPNAVINST 1000.16K. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I:  The introduction identifies the purpose of the research as stated in the 
primary and secondary research questions. 
Chapter II:  Contains a literature review of paper and electronic publications 
pertaining to the research. 
Chapter III:  Methodology 
Chapter IV:  Manpower Requirements Process 
Chapter V:  Summary, conclusion, and recommendations  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION TO LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a general overview of corrective and preventive 
maintenance (PM:CM) literature related to the establishment of manpower requirements 
aboard U.S. Navy ships. There has not been a study on PM:CM since a Center for Naval 
Analyses (CNA) study 24 years ago showed that the PM:CM ratio used by the Navy was 
understated (Lurie, 1987). Technical reports and periodicals on Human Systems 
Integration (HSI), lean manning, and Navy mishap data provide underlying information 
for understanding the relationship between maintenance manpower and manning levels 
on Navy ships. 
The review is divided into four sections; Section B provides a military regulatory 
framework based on Department of the Navy (DON) policy and maintenance.  Section C 
reviews background materials from the Navy’s manpower and personnel organization, 
the Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) in Millington, TN. Section D 
introduces a third set of underlying material including findings from two NPS theses 
about U.S. Navy shipboard operational and functional manning.  Section E concludes the 
review by linking the topic area with some current Navy manpower and manning 
challenges including functional maintenance, operational and Lean manning (Ewing, 
2009). 
B. NAVY GUIDANCE 
OPNAV Instruction 4700.7K, Maintenance Policy for U.S. Navy Ships, includes 
39 references and seven enclosures clarifying the maintenance policy.  It specifically 
instructs commanders to utilize the Maintenance and Material Management System (3-
M) system as the primary management tool for maintenance on all non-nuclear Navy 




and detailed in explaining maintenance procedures, the Open Architectural Retrieval 
System (OARS) is not mentioned as a planning, documenting, or reporting tool in any 
part of the instruction text, or in the enclosures. 
OPNAVINST 4790.4E, Ship’s Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) 
System Policy establishes policy and assigns responsibility for 3-M using the previously 
discussed OPNAVINST 4700.7K. 
Section 5 of OPNAVINST 4790.4E,  clarifies that accurate documentation of 
maintenance is required for controlling and evaluating manpower and material resources 
used to support maintenance.  The accuracy of documenting maintenance is a precursor 
to monitoring a ship(s) operating costs. 
OPNAVINST 4790.16, Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) Policy, applies to 
all U.S. Navy ships and aircraft, except for those operated by civilians.  The CBM 
strategy is to “perform maintenance only when there is objective evidence of need, while 
ensuring safety, equipment reliability, and reduction of total ownership cost.  The goal is 
to optimize readiness while reducing maintenance and manning requirements” (OPNAV 
INST 4790.16, 1998, p. 1).  Section 5, part j, assigns responsibility to the Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations (Manpower and Personnel) to coordinate the implementation of 
manpower reduction initiatives resulting from the implementation of CBM procedures.  
Throughout the instruction, two objectives are made clear; reduce operating costs and 
manning using CBM. 
This CBM instruction captures a common business production conclusion that 
reduces maintenance requirements and translates them into reduced operating costs.  The 
successful use of proven new technology can maximize workload and potentially reduce 
the numbers of personnel needed, e.g., ATM machines and fewer bank tellers (Ewing, 
2009) found that Navy ships following the instruction tended toward reduced 
maintenance hours.  Yet alongside that positive result, Ewing found negative 
climate/cultural behaviors that may or may not be related issues surrounding corrective 
and preventive maintenance (PM:CM).  He perceived a decrease in sailor morale, 
increase work hours, indication of work-hour misrepresentation, and an increased risk for 
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accidents and injury (Ewing, 2009).  Evolution frequency tables project aspects of tasks 
performed at sea during a sixty-day at-sea period.  These tables assist commanders in 
preparing manpower documents for underway periods.  One observation limitation is that 
the frequency tables do not provide information on the rank or number of personnel 
required to conduct an evolution.  Ships are listed by ship class number, and columns 
show the brief title of a particular evolution.  Under each evolution are the numbers of 
personnel needed to accomplish the task.  This table is the primary source for computing 
corrective and preventive maintenance ratios needed to perform all routine maintenance 
in normal, condition 3 underway steaming for 60 days (Cox, 2002, p. 1).  The cruiser and 
destroyer Evolution Frequency Table is shown in Table 1. 
 
EVOLUTION FREQUENCY TABLE 
























































































CG 47 3 20 4 2 6 32 * 4 6 10 
DD 963 3 20 4 2 6 32 * 4 6 10 
DDG-51 FLT I 
& II 
3 20 4 2 6 32 * 4 6 10 
FFG 7 3 20 4 2 6 32 * 4 6 5 
Table 1.   Evolution Frequency Table (From Cox, 2002, p. 2) 
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C. NAVAL MANPOWER AND ANALYSIS CENTER DOCUMENTATION 
The following includes memorandums, presentations, and correspondence 
relating to maintenance requirements for Navy ships. 
OPNAV Instruction 1000.16K, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies Procedures, 
provides the policies and procedures required to develop, review, approve, and 
implement an update Total Force manpower requirements and authorizations for all naval 
activities (Unites Sates Navy, 2007, p. 2-1).  Section 3 specifically addresses fleet 
manpower requirements determination. 
The Ship/Fleet Manpower Document Development Procedures Manual (SMDDP) 
encompasses three manpower development systems; the Ship or Fleet Manpower 
Document (SMD/FMD) Program, the Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) Program, 
and the Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD) program.  Basic 
manpower requirements are “zero-based”.  Using zero-based planning, requirements are 
submitted without regard for funds, available number of personnel, or available shipboard 
berthing.  Once manpower levels are projected, commanders must justify their 
requirements by providing approved operational requirements using the Required 
Operational Capabilities (ROC) and Projected Operational Environment (POE) (United 
States Navy, 2007, p. 2–1). 
Section 404, the Navy Standard Workweek, is a key element in determining 
accurate manpower requirement levels.  The Navy standard workweek applies to all 
ships, afloat staffs, mobilization units, and Number Fleet Commanders unless specifically 
precluded.  Using the Navy standard workweek analysis a sailor is available for 168 
hours of which, 70 are allocated for productive work.  Of those 70 hours, 56 are 
dedicated to primary watch-standing leaving 14 hours to perform maintenance related 
functions (Department of the Navy, 2007, p. C1–C9). 
Training material created by analyst at NAVMAC for in-house training was used 
to explain the use of documented maintenance hours as an input factor in the 
development of manpower requirements.  There are five basic types of maintenance 
performed on ships at sea under Condition III: 
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• Daily checks 
• Weekly checks 
• Monthly checks 
• Quarterly checks 
• “R” checks- unscheduled maintenance 
The data is converted to average “weekly” hours spent on maintenance.  The data 
is collected and separated by rate, Navy Enlisted Classification Code (NEC), and division 
for each ship and type.  Make ready/put away (MR/PA) is accounted for with a factor of 
15 percent added to the baseline allotted for each job.  This allowance is applied only 
preventive maintenance only.  MR/PA accounts for preparation, tool gathering, necessary 
cleanup, tag outs, and other steps that do not include directly performing the maintenance 
function. 
Corrective maintenance ratios describe the relationship between corrective 
maintenance completed in relation to the preventive maintenance performed.  The ratios 
are applied based on the type of equipment being maintained.  A 2:1 ratio of PM:CM is 
applied to mechanical equipment, and a 1:1 PM:CM ratio is applied to electrical 
equipment. 
Productivity Allowances (PA) account for delays due to fatigue, environmental 
effects, personal needs, or other unavoidable interruptions that increase the baseline time 
for the job.  The percentage increase for PA is between 2–8 percent and is only applied to 
corrective, own unit support, and facilities maintenance actions.  PA levels were 
previously set a 20 percent across the board, but were reduced in 2002, by OPNAV N12 
during his lean manning initiative.  The reduction of 12–18 percent in PA allowances 










2 percent Work is conducted in a temperature-controlled environment.  It is normally 
administrative in nature with minimal maintenance and the level of physical effort is 
light.  Any watches would normally be conducted under environmentally controlled 
conditions.  However, it would not be unexpected for an individual to b exposed to the 
weather for short periods of time.  Noise levels are relatively low. 
4 percent Work is mostly conducted in a temperature-controlled environment with light to 
moderate maintenance.  May be slightly dirty or greasy where the level of physical effort 
is moderate.  However, personnel may minimal/nominal exposure to weather and/or be 
physically stressful.  Situational awareness is necessary, but not distracting.  
6 percent Work is conducted in a light industrial environment or partially exposed to the weather 
and may encounter disagreeable odors.  The level of physical effort is significant.  
Personnel may be subjected to noise and/or heat stress monitoring.  Personal injury is 
possible but not immediately expected.  Situational awareness is required, but does not 
require continuous safety supervision.  
8 percent Work is conducted in a heavy industrial environment or personnel are continuously 
exposed to the weather and/or disagreeable odors and fumes, etc.  The level of effort is 
heavy and personnel may be subjected to continuous noise and/or heat stress monitoring.  
Personal injury can be expected under hazardous conditions and a heightened situational 
awareness is required.  
Table 2.   Productivity Allowance Table  (From McGovern, Ship/Fleet Manpower ) 
Commander R. E. Loken developed an instructional memorandum to introduce 
the concept of corrective maintenance to personnel unfamiliar with it.  Corrective 
maintenance is directly related to preventive maintenance that is based on data in each 
ship’s 3-M system.  As described in the previous document there is a ratio between 
preventive and corrective maintenance.  This ratio was developed in 1985, and is used 
when corrective maintenance data is not available for use (Loken, 2001, p.1). 
Documentation of corrective maintenance is required in the Organizational 
Maintenance Management System (OMMS).  NAVMAC has access to CM data using 
the OARS. Although OARS collects CM data that can be sorted by ship class, unit 
identification code (UIC), hull number, work center, rate, and NEC it does not have the 
ability to identify CM that was performed underway. 
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Loken’s memo brings up the main issue of this research; CM levels do not seem 
to be accurately documented when a ship is underway.  Whether mission needs take 
precedence or an increase in workload lessen the importance of the Maintenance Material 
Manager Coordinator (3MC) inputting all CM data during deployments, there seems to 
be a disparity in the reporting of CM data when ships are underway. 
In e-mail correspondence shared by NAVMAC, Machinist Mate Senior Chief, 
(SW) Mark Opasinksi discusses the problems with the current method of reporting and 
gathering preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance data.  The lack of a 
standardized reporting method and an OMMS system that is not user friendly has 3-MCs 
choosing not to report maintenance performed. Some commands believe “more data = 
more people”, so erroneous data is being recorded resulting in inaccurate figures being 
represented in OARS (Opasinski, 2008). 
Opasinski offers possible solutions like tailored CM multiples based on ship class, 
and using PMS as the only reporting system; however, insists that any changes must be 
Navy wide and have full support from all levels of management. 
D. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Previous analysis is limited to a Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study 
performed by Philip Lurie in 1987 (Estimating Maintenance Workloads with PM:CM 
Ratios, CRM 87-39).  The Lurie study evaluated maintenance on 14 electrical and 15 
mechanical systems over a three-year period for the Navy Maintenance Support Office 
(NMSO).  His data showed the ratio for electrical systems was 1:4.3, and for mechanical 
systems it was 1:3.12, both higher than the ratios established by the Navy (Lurie, 1987, p. 
5–6). 
Other work of interest on this area was a thesis by Lieutenant Lazaretti that 
researches Human Systems Integration (HSI), a “process designed to reduce life-cycle 
costs and improve system performance by considering human-related domains” 




maintenance ships on Navy has not been performed in over 25 years Lazaretti’s thesis 
used maintenance, manpower and mishaps, and system performance data in support of 
his conclusions. 
While no causal relationship was found between manpower and mishaps in his 
particular study, Lazzaretti attributed this to a lack of useable manpower data.  Current 
data is not able to distinguish the difference in work performed underway with maximum 
manning levels and work performed in port with lower manning levels.  The difference in 
weekly work hours also decreases between at sea and in port time periods. The lack of 
ability to distinguish between manning and functional workload causes the average 
weekly work hours per sailor to be inaccurately derived for the appropriate manning 
levels (Lazzaretti, 2008, p. 48). 
In a separate study, Manning and Automation Model for Naval Ship Analysis and 
Automation, Lieutenant Tyson Scofield specifies that human resources are the largest 
lifecycle expense in maintaining a ship.  He argues that if more attention were paid the 
development and design of new ships it could directly lead to a reduction in long-term 
manning costs.  Scofield introduces the Integrated Simulation Manning Analysis Tool 
(ISMAT) that uses the ship type, systems, and maintenance strategy and automation level 
of the ship to determine accurate manning levels.  Scofield developed this program and 
tested it on an Air Superiority Cruiser (CG-X) as part of the research (Scofield, 2006). 
In his conclusion, Scofield noticed that maintenance had an insignificant effect on 
ship manning levels.  The most important determinants of manning were automation 
level of the ship and the length of the ship.  Scofield noted the effects of maintenance on 
manning as “surprising” and suggested that the accuracy of maintenance data should be 
researched for accuracy.  He proposed that studies be done to assess the actual time spent 
on maintenance tasks relative to other tasks.  It is important to note that this is the same 
conclusion reached by the staff at NAVMAC. 
E. PERIODICALS 
When OPNAV N12 reduced PM:CM ratios in 2002 it led to a decrease in the 
manpower requirement across all Navy ships.  The decrease of more than 60,000 sailors 
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since has caused some sailors to voice concerns about unit morale, safety, mishaps and 
retention. Although the articles do not mention maintenance as an agitator, the reduction 
in maintenance ratios caused a reduction in manpower requirements.  These articles show 
the importance of being able to accurately derive manning levels for ships. 
The Navy Inspector General (IG) has investigated recent mishaps onboard Navy 
ships and concluded that, 
Manning issues abounded throughout the region and clearly represented 
the greatest concern with regard to commanders’ ability to safely and 
effectively accomplish their missions…Numerous manpower reduction 
initiatives, combined with manpower ‘taxes’ on commands to accomplish 
external missions, severely test many commands’ ability to function. 
(Ewing, 2009) 
In 2002, the Navy changed the standard workweek from 67 hours to 70 hours of 
productive work. According to Commander Bill Hatch, Ret., the increase of three hours 
over 350,000 sailors meant that manpower analyst formulas would reflect requirements 
that optimally called for fewer personnel.  Some ships (destroyers/cruisers) lost about 40 
to 50 sailors each.  The ships technology did not change, and they have prematurely aged 
as shown in recent failures of INSURV (Inspection and Survey) inspections.  
Maintenance requirements have remained the same, but the number of sailors available to 
address the maintenance is now lower (Ewing, 2009). 
The introduction of condition based maintenance has also been used to reduce 
manning requirements.  Condition based maintenance requires maintenance to only be 
performed when needed.  The requirement for preventive maintenance is removed that 
reduces the number of hours spend on maintenance.  That change is also reflected in 
manning requirements that are produced by NAVMAC analysts. 
Recently Vice Admiral Harvey has acknowledged that “lean manning” has not 
worked the way it was intended.  Currently the Navy is assessing ship crew levels and 
adding billets where required to fix the problems encountered (Ewing, 2009). 
In response to a blog that begins with the quote, “fewer resources mean that there 
are things we will do less, but not less well.” Admiral Harvey responds with “…we are 
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not free to do anything less well” (Harvey, 2010). Vice Admiral Harvey implores his 
commanding officers to be honest while assessing the capabilities of their crew, and 
when indicating what missions they will be able to complete. 
He makes it clear that if a ship does not have the resources to train, equip, and 
man for all missions, then the commanding officer is in a position to prioritize 
requirements or not do them all well.  He asks his commanders to “commit” truth and 
follow the facts. It is understandable from his words that he knows that manning is not 
optimal on all ships currently and some missions will not be able to be done.  His point is 
just that commanding officers must relay the truth up the chain of command for changes 
to take place. 
F. SUMMARY 
Fleet mission and material readiness relies on proper manpower, manning, and 
training.  Having the wrong quantity or quality of sailors on board can have a negative 
impact on mission and readiness.  It is paramount that Navy manpower requirements are 
calculated using accurate metrics. 
Ships are built around designed capabilities and mission in mind. Those 
capabilities will be degraded without adequate supporting manpower.  Today’s Force 
Protection postures rely on sailors that are just as busy in port as underway.  Ships have 
external manpower requirements to supplement Naval Station security, gate guards, and 
own ship security while in port.  Reduced manning initiatives may lead to a multitude of 
unintended consequences including longer workdays, less security, and reduced retention. 
The inceptions of optimal manning, change in training method, and increased in-
port workload, have made it increasingly difficult for ship crews to keep up with 
shipboard maintenance.  Reviewing PM:CM data and re-assessing the ratio to determine 





A. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
The methodology used in this research consisted of the following steps: 
1. A literature review was conducted on applicable books, defense articles, 
CD-ROM systems, theses, Internet, and other library information resources on the topic. 
2. Conducted a thorough review of PM:CM maintenance requirements and 
standards. 
3. Conducted a thorough review of ship Manpower requirements and OARS 
reporting system. 
4. Conducted an extensive data analysis on DDG corrective maintenance 
data provided by NAVSEA pertaining to all corrective maintenance jobs entered into the 
OARS system between June 2008 and August 2010.  There were a total of 54,683 jobs 
entered reviewed.  The data was organized by ship class, hull, and work center. 
5. Using deployment information from the Naval History and Heritage 
Command and Navsource, we selected a deployment period of sixty days or longer for 
each ship.  Corrective maintenance data from these dates was used to generate the 
PM:CM ratio for each ship. 
6. Using the analyzed data, a graphic representation was produced that 
compared the PM:CM ratio derived from the CM data and compared it to the standard 
PM:CM ratio determined by NAVMAC. 
7. Provide recommendations based on this analysis for future review/study if 
an improved approach to the documenting of corrective maintenance would result in a 
better defined PM:CM ratio that can be applied to all Navy ships. 
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B. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The following table provides a description of the variables provided in the data 
set: 
VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION 
SHIP CLASS Enter Ship Class. Named after the lead ship; that is, the first ship of that class 
to be approved by Congress—almost (but not quite) without exception the ship 
of the class with the lowest hull number.  
UIC Enter the UIC of the activity initiating the maintenance action 
SHIP TYPE HULL The ship type and hull number of the activity originating the maintenance 
action. Not required by activities other than ships.  
WORK CENTER Enter the work center code of the work center initiating the maintenance 
action. For ships, a four position work center code will be entered.  
JOB SEQUENCE 
NUMBER 
Enter the character job sequence number assigned by the work center 
supervisor.  This is an entry assigned sequentially from the SFWL/JSN log. 
RATE Enter the rate of the first contact/maintenance person. 
SHIP FORCE MAN 
HOURS 
The total man hours (to the nearest whole hour) that ship’s force used doing the 
maintenance after submitting the deferral.  It includes witnessing of tests, and 
those manhours expended in reinstallation, test, documentation, etc. 
Documentation time cannot exceed “1” hour.  
ACTIVE 
MAINTENANCE TIME 
Total clock hours (to the nearest whole hour) during which ship’s force 
maintenance was actually performed. This should include time for 
troubleshooting, but not delays.  
TYPE AVAILABILITY 
CODE 
Type of availability recommended for performance of a deferral. 
Code   Description 
1.  Depot (shipyard or ship repair facility) 
2.  Intermediate Maintenance Activity (tender, repair ship, 
etc.) 
3 . TYCOM Support Unit (floating dry dock, etc., or technical assistance from 
NAVUNDERSEAWARCEN, DETACHMENT FTSCLANT, FTSCPAC or 
contractor representative) 
4.  Ship's Force 
0.  Not Applicable 
U.  Mission Degrading 
Used by INSURV, field identifies certain deficiencies that are 





A code to describe the maintenance action taken. Select the code that best 
describes the action taken to complete the maintenance. When recording these 
codes, start in the left justified position of the field. The first character is to be 
chosen from the list below; the second character is free-form and is to be 
recorded as specified by the TYCOM. MAINTENANCE ACTION: For 
maintenance action reporting, the following action codes can be used: 
Code Description 
1. Maintenance Action Completed; Parts Drawn from Supply 
2. Maintenance Action Completed; Required Parts Not Drawn from Supply 
(local manufacture, pre-expended bins, etc.) 
3. Maintenance Action Completed; No Parts Required 
4. Canceled (When this code is used, the deferral will be removed from the 
CSMP. This code is not to be used with INSURV, safety, or priority 1 or 2  
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VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION 
deferrals screened for accomplishment by the TYCOM or IUC.) 
7.  Maintenance Action Completed; 2-M (Miniature/Micro miniature 
Electronic Modules) 
 Capability Utilized 
8.  Periodic Time Meter/Cycle Counter reporting. (This code is not applicable 
to the "FINAL ACTION" code  reported by the repair activity.) 
9.  Maintenance Action Completed; 3M Fiber Optic Repair 
EQUIPMENT 
NOMENCLATURE 
Enter the equipment nomenclature/description that maintenance is being 
reported.  The equipment nomenclature/description should be the same as that 
identified by the Equipment Identification Code (EIC) and is limited to 16 
positions. 
APL Allowance Parts List/Allowance Equipment List. Enter the APL/AEL of the 
equipment being reported.  These numbers are found in the COSAL or SCLSIS 
Index report.  An example of an APL would be “882170236” and an AEL 
would be “2-260034096.” 
CSMP NARRATIVE 
SUMMARY 
Enter a condensed description of the problem.  The work center supervisor is to 
ensure the summary succinctly captures the meaning of the 
REMARKS/DESCRIPTION narrative. The CSMP summary conveys to 
management the significance of the JCN (maintenance action).  The CSMP 
summary is displayed on management reports, as opposed to the entire 
narrative of the REMARKS block. 
PROBLEM 
DESCRIPTION 
Provide information that 
describes the problem and what caused the failure (if known) 
ACTUAL SOLUTION Enter steps and actions that must be taken to correct the problem. 
DATE OPENING The Julian date the document is prepared. 
DATE CLOSING The Julian date the work request is completed and signed off by the requesting 
ship. 
Table 3.   OARS CM Database Headings with Descriptions (From NAVSEA, 2003) 
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
Data was scrubbed and analyzed under three different scenarios in order to 
present the best and worst possible PM:CM ratios. 
Scenario 1:  A deployment of 60 or more days was selected for each ship. For the 
deployment period selected, all jobs that were entered as completed by a civilian 
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contractor were removed.  All remaining jobs that were either started or completed during 
the specified deployment dates were used in the derivation of the PM:CM ratio. 
Scenario 2:  A deployment of 60 or more days was selected for each ship. For the 
deployment period selected, all jobs that were entered as completed by a civilian 
contractor were removed.  All jobs that were considered facilities maintenance were not 
included in the established PM:CM ratio calculation.  All remaining jobs that were either 
started or completed during the specified deployment dates were used in the derivation of 
the PM:CM ratio. 
Scenario 3:  A deployment of 60 or more days was selected for each ship. For the 
deployment period selected, all jobs that were entered as completed by a civilian 
contractor were removed.  All jobs that were considered facilities maintenance were not 
included in the established PM:CM ratio calculation.  Of the remaining jobs, only those 
that were started and completed during the deployment were started and completed 
during the specified deployment dates were used in the derivation of the PM:CM ratio. 
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IV. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS PROCESS 
A. SURFACE SHIPS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS OVERVIEW 
Manpower requirements represent measured workload in support of the number 
of personnel required to perform the Navy’s mission.  OPNAVINST 1000.16K states that 
“manpower requirements shall reflect the minimum quantity, calculated using the 
approved Navy Standard Work Weeks, and quality of manpower required for peacetime 
and wartime to effectively and efficiently accomplish the activity’s mission” (p. 2-2).  A 
requirement equates to a space that is assigned specific qualifications that are required to 
accomplish the assigned task, function, or duty.  There are four types of manpower 
requirements:  Fleet, Shore, Individual Accounts, and Outside Navy Requirements.  For 
purposes of this study, we will discuss how Fleet Manpower Requirements are 
determined. 
Fleet Manpower Requirements are determined by NAVMAC and represent work 
requirements on ships, squadrons, and other deployable units.  Fleet Manpower 
Requirements is a standards-based system governed by required operational capabilities 
and projected operational environments (ROC/POE) and approved by the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO).  A ROC/POE is therefore a foundation document that manpower 
requirements are determined from.  Inaccurate reporting of operational capabilities and 
mission tasking may result in a loss of money or manning essential to accomplishing the 
platform mission (McGovern, 2003, p. 2–1).  OPNAVINST 1000.16K states, “Total 
Force requirements shall reflect the appropriate mix of military, civil service and private 
sector manpower necessary to accomplish DOD missions consistent with applicable laws, 
policies, and regulations (p. 2-2). 
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B. ROC/POE 
1. Required Operational Capabilities 
The DDG-51 ROC is established by OPNAVINST 3501.311A.  Required 
operational capabilities are reported as readiness conditions.  A readiness conditions is “a 
statement that describes an action that must be performed by a ship in support of its 
assigned mission.  These capability statements provide the necessary detail and criteria 
for translating tasking to the manpower required to perform the various operational, 
maintenance, and support tasks essential to effective performance of the mission for all 
conditions of readiness” ‘(McGovern, 2005, p. II-2).  Readiness applies to watch standing 
and/or evolutions and other work applies to non-watch standing activities such as 
performing maintenance.  The following summarizes the readiness conditions: 
• Condition I: (Battle Readiness).  All personnel are continuously alert.  All 
possible operational systems are manned and operating.  No maintenance 
is expected except that routinely associated with watch standing and 
urgent repairs.  Maximum expected crew endurance at Condition I is 24 
continuous hours. 
• Condition II: (Limited Action).  Accomplishment of urgent underway PM 
and support functions is expected.  A minimum of four to six hours of rest 
is provided per man per day.  Subject to these conditions, required 
operational systems are continuously manned and operating.  Maximum 
expected crew endurance at Condition II is ten continuous days. 
• Condition III:  Wartime Cruising Readiness.  Operational systems are 
manned and operating as necessary, to conform with prescribed ROCs.  
Accomplishment of all normal underway maintenance, support, and 
administrative functions is expected.  Opportunity for eight hours of rest 
provided per man per day.  Maximum expected crew endurance at 
Condition III is 60 continuous days. 
• Condition IV:  Peacetime Cruising Readiness.  Operational systems are 
normally manned only to the extent necessary for effective ship control, 
propulsion, and security. 
• Condition V:  In port Readiness.  Systems and watch stations are manned 
to the extent necessary for effective operations as dictated by the existing 
situation.  Watch stations are assigned as required to provide adequate 
security.  Personnel on board are at all times adequate to meet anticipated 
in port emergencies and perform in port functions as prescribed by unit 
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ROCs.  Accomplishment of all required maintenance, support, and 
administrative functions is expected.  Maximum advantage is taken of 
training opportunities.  Subject to the foregoing requirements, the crew 
will be provided maximum opportunity for rest, leave, and liberty. 
(McGovern, 2005, p. II-1) 
2. Projected Operational Environment 
The DDG-51 POE is established by OPNAVINST 3501.311A.  The POE defines 
the circumstances and environments the DDG-51 is anticipated to work under while 
maintaining Readiness Condition I thru V.  Per OPNAVINST 3501.311A (enclosure 1), 
“the DDG-51 Class shall be capable of performing all assigned primary mission areas 
simultaneously while maintaining Readiness Condition I, II, III (wartime/forward 
deployment cruising readiness), IV (peacetime training underway operations) or V (in 
port training and maintenance)” 
C. WORKLOAD DETERMINATION 
Determining the correct functional workload is the beginning of the manpower 
determination process.  Workload determination consists of operational manning (watch 
stations), planned and corrective maintenance, and facility maintenance.  Administrative 
support, command, supply, and medical requirements are also accounted for in this 
process.  Additional tasks referred to as evolutions such as replenishment at-sea is also 
considered.  Actual work is measured through the use of industrial engineering 
techniques, frequent on-site observations conducted by trained NAVMAC analysts, and 
the use of supplemental data from Navy management information systems such as 
Maintenance and Material Management (3M) System. 
D. NAVY STANDARD WORKWEEK 
The Navy Standard Workweek is a key element used in determining manpower 
requirements.  The Navy Standard Workweek, shown in Figure 1, establishes a guideline 
for sustaining personnel during wartime or peacetime conditions.  For purposes of this 
study, we will focus on the Navy Standard Workweek Afloat.  Once the workload 
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required is validated, the “approved Navy Standard Afloat productive workweek is 
applied in a series of calculations to derive the staffing required” (McGovern, 2003, p. 3-
2). 
Navy Standard Workweek Afloat





Training (7)(i.e.GQ, not GMT)
Service Diversion (4)




Figure 1.  Navy Standard Workweek Afloat (From McGovern, 2003, p. 3–2) 
E. STANDARDS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE MANPOWER 
REQUIREMENTS PROCESS 
The Navy Manpower Requirements System (NMRS) is an automated information 
system that determines manpower requirements.  The standards for determining 
manpower requirements are a collection of a measured workload and the essential skills 
necessary to perform identified tasks.  Total workload is comprised of four standards 
used to calculate the operational manning. 
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1. Operational Manning 
Operational Manning or “Watch Stations” is the quantitative and qualitative sum 
of manpower required to man operating stations during the different conditions of 
readiness.  “Watch Stations” manpower requirements are specified by the ships’ function.  
Qualitative requirements include requirements such as rate, rating, and Navy Enlisted 
Classification Code (NEC), that are determined by the Manual of Navy Enlisted 
Manpower and Personnel Classifications and Occupational Standards, NAVPERS 18068 
(series).  These are the minimum skills and training required to perform the duties of a 
particular watch station or function.  Documentation to support a watch or station 
requirement is necessary to establish the need for manning for a particular operation.  A 
comprehensive study and analysis is normally involved of each operating station in 
accordance to the requirements listed in the ROC. 
2. Own Unit Support 
Own Unit Support (OUS) is the quantitative sum of manpower necessary to 
perform administrative, command, supply, medical, and environmental management 
tasks, including shipboard evolutions.  Because of the complexity and variety of skill 
levels associated with the various categories of OUS, there is no set work study technique 
used in developing OUS manpower requirements.  Instead, data is gathered for the 
different functions using task analysis, operational audits and reviews, work measurement 
and method study, and work sampling. 
3. Direct Requirements 
Directed Requirements is the sum of the qualitative and quantitative manpower 
positions needed to perform duties directed by the CNO, CNO agents and/or special 
programs.  Directed requirements are not necessarily driven by measured workloads.  
Instead they are often based on population size or unique skill.  Workload and manhours 
are associated to a requirement or a unique skill.  We found no further studies done 
justifying directed requirements that are written at the sole discretion of the Office of the 
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Chief of Naval Operations.  An example of directed requirements may be for a platform 
to have a Command Master Chief, Navy Career Counselor, or Corpsman. 
F. MAINTENANCE  
Maintenance is the last variable in determining manpower requirements.  
Maintenance is the qualitative and quantitative sum of manpower that is required to 
perform planned, corrective and facilities maintenance.  “Whether considering a routine 
maintenance action such as an oil change, equipment repair, or housekeeping work to 
maintain cleanliness, it meets the definitions for maintenance and the workload is 
quantifiable, it must be factored into maintenance manning” (McGovern, 2003, p. 3-6).  
Incremental times necessary to accomplish CM, PM, and FM are summed to provide a 
total maintenance manhour requirement.  The source of maintenance manpower 
requirement can be traced back to the “other work” portion of the productive work week. 
1. Planned Maintenance 
Preventive maintenance is mandated by the Navy preventive maintenance system 
(PMS).  “In quantitative terms, it is the total workload associated with the performance of 
preventive maintenance actions on operational systems, equipment, or components 
contributing to uninterrupted operations within design characteristics” (McGovern, 2003, 
p. 3-6).  The only planned maintenance that is considered to be valid workload is 
maintenance conducted underway, during Condition III as specified in the ROC/POE.  
Only PM that is done quarterly or less is collected. 
Total manhours associated with PM are:  make-ready, accomplishing the 
maintenance action, put-away, and data recording. MRCs and MIPs record only average 
times required for actual tasks accomplished on the maintenance action.  Make-ready, 
put-away, and documentation times are not excluded and therefore task times must be 
adjusted to account for these times in a PM action and to include the actual work 




factor for make-ready and put-away on PM only and a floating 2–8 percent productivity 
allowance factor for CM, FM and OUS workload” (McGovern, 2003, p. 3-8).  Work 
elements associated with PM include: 
• Make-Ready.  This includes drawing the Maintenance Requirement Card 
(MRC); obtaining necessary instruction manuals, tools, and materials; 
transit to the work area; and any preparatory work that may be required, 
such as removal of interference, tagging-out of electrical circuits and 
valves. 
• Accomplishment of the Maintenance Action.  This includes completion of 
all procedures detailed listed on the MRC only. 
• Put-Away.  This includes necessary replacement of interference; cleanup; 
return of tools, manuals, and MRCs; removing all tag-outs and returning 
circuits and valves to their original positions, and any required transits. 
• Data Recording.  This includes completion of forms or other records 
reporting accomplishment of the maintenance action and is accounted for 
in the OUS workload category. (McGovern, 2003, p. 3-7) 
2. Corrective Maintenance 
Corrective Maintenance is unscheduled work that is done to repair malfunctions, 
failure, or deterioration of shipboard equipment.  Quantitatively, it is “the workload 
associated with the restoration of disabled systems, equipment, or components to an 
operational condition within predetermined tolerances and limitations for which there is a 
corresponding PM action” (McGovern, 2003, p. 3-9).  Make-ready, put-away, 
accomplishing of the corrective action, and data recording are also elements considered 
in determining total manhours. 
Requirements for CM are determined by applying the PM:CM ratio.  “If the 
PM:CM ratio was 1:1, then for each manhour allocated to PM, one additional manhour 
would be allocated to CM.  If the PM:CM ratio was 2:1, then one-half hour of CM would 
be allocated for each hour of PM (Lurie, 1987, p. 1).  Work elements associated with CM 




• Make-Ready.  This includes obtaining necessary instruction manuals, 
tools, and materials; transit to the work area; tagging-out of electrical 
circuits and valves and removal of interference.  Research necessary to 
determine part requirements and execution of supply of supply forms is 
also included in this element. 
• Accomplishment of the Corrective (repair) Action.  This includes opening 
of equipment, fault isolation, effecting necessary repairs, testing and 
adjustment, and closing equipment. 
• Put-Away.  This includes replacement of interference; necessary cleanup; 
return of tools and manuals; removing all tag-outs and returning circuits 
and valves to their original positions and any required transits. 
• Data recording.  This includes completion of necessary forms to report the 
action  taken and preparation of a repair request, if the repair is beyond the 
capability of ship’s force.  Data recording is accounted for in the OUS 
workload category. (McGovern, 2003, p. 3–9) 
3. Facility Maintenance 
Facility Maintenance is the quantitative and qualitative sum of the manpower it 
takes to maintain the material condition of the ship.  This includes cleanliness, sanitation 
of all living areas, preservation against corrosion and deterioration of hull, decks, 
superstructure, and equipment.  Collecting data used to determine this workload consists 
of “digitizing space measurements and manually computing of FM workload” 
(McGovern, 2003, p. 3–9).  Make-ready, put-away, and accomplishing of the corrective 
action are also elements considered in determining total manhours and are defined below: 
• Make-ready.  This includes obtaining necessary tools and materials, 
transits to the  work area, and any advanced preparation such as rigging of 
boatswain’s chairs, stages, floats, etc. (Not to be confused with MR/PA 
allowance for Preventive Maintenance). 
• Accomplishment of the work action.  This includes the actual 
accomplishment of a   FM requirement.  Examples of such requirements 
are: 
  (a) sweeping and swabbing decks 
(b) cleaning of heads and compartments 
(c) painting (includes preparation of surfaces) 
(d) polishing bright work 
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• Put-Away.  This includes necessary cleanup, breaking down of 
boatswain’s chairs, stages, etc.; return or stowage of tools; and necessary 
transits. (Not to be confused with MR/PA allowance for Preventive 




(SMD/FMDs) W hat if?
R EQU IREMEN TS INF ORM ATION
C OM PU TER  OPTIMIZ ATION
TO TAL W OR KLO AD
(M an -hour s)
FLEET VA LIDA TIO N VIS ITS &  O THER  D A TA
R OC /PO E &  CO NFIGU RA TIO N
OPE RAT IO NAL
M ANNING





REQ UIR EM ENTS
  
Figure 2.  Manpower Methodology (From McGovern, 2003, p. 5–2) 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This researched analyzed the current Corrective Maintenance for DDG class ships 
and compared it to the Preventive/Corrective maintenance (PM:CM) ratio used by the 
Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) as directed by OPNAVINST 1000.16K to 
establish Navy fleet manpower requirements.  A site visit to a DDG in San Diego was 
conducted to observe how data was collected to validate the Ship Manpower Document 
(SMD)  The current preventive maintenance ratio was established in 1968.  Since then 
Make Ready/Put Away, productivity allowance, and watch standing hours have been 
modified, but the PM:CM ratio has remained unchanged.  In 1987, the Center for Naval 
Analyses (CNA) was commissioned to study the PM:CM ratio.  The study conducted by 
Lurie examined corrective maintenance performed on 14 electrical systems and 15 
mechanical systems.  The results produced 1:4 electrical and 1:3 mechanical ratios, 
supporting the likelihood that the Navy’s ratio understated the corrective maintenance 
functional workload. 
Based on the assessment of the data reviewed, corrective maintenance on board 
DDG-51 class ships is greater than what the PM:CM ratio predicts and what is reflected 
in the functional workload section of the Ship Manpower Document.  Figures 3 and 4 
show that in all instances, the PM:CM ratio derived using Open Architectural Retrieval 
System (OARS) data is higher than what the current ratio predicts.  OARS data shows an 
average mechanical maintenance ratio of 1: 1.64 and an average electrical maintenance 
ratio of 1: 10.9.  Appendices A through D show corrective maintenance hours by work 
center, ship hull, flight, total hours, weekly hours, and selected ship board systems. 
The effect to SMD requirements is shown on Tables 4 and 5.  Using OARS 
corrective maintenance data from this study, the requirements would increase on every 
flight for EA work center by an average of 3.2 requirements.  The CF work center 
experienced an average increase of 2.7 requirements per flight in four of the five flights.  
The effect to SMD requirements if OPNAVINST 1000.16K and NAVMAC guidance 
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was strictly followed as shown in Table 6.  The results show an average increase of 5.8 
requirements in both the Engineering work center EA and Combat Systems work center 
CF affecting all flights. 
B. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Does the current corrective maintenance in the SMD represent actual work as 
reported in NAVSEA OARS database? 
a. Conclusion: The study concluded that corrective maintenance is not being 
identified correctly in manpower requirements.  The data used for this analysis found the 
PM:CM ratios needs to change to 1:10.9 for electrical systems and 1:1.64 for mechanical.  
Our results show that the PM:CM ratio is approximately ten times higher for electrical 
systems and almost two times higher for mechanical systems than the current 1:1 and 2:1 
ratio.  Figures 1 and 2 show the PM:CM ratios based on our analysis.  Factors that may 
contribute towards ratio(s) overestimation appear to stem from insufficient/inaccurate 
maintenance documentation and lack of awareness and training in this area. 
In 2001, Required Operational Capabilities/Projected Operating Environment 
(ROC/POEs) were revised based on the optimum manning initiative, which changed the 
DDG-51 SMDs.  The optimum manning initiative removed several billets from ships.  
Rather than eliminating or decreasing maintenance responsibilities, maintenance 
requirements were distributed to remaining onboard personnel (Balisle, 2010 p. 12). 
In 2002, the equation used to calculate minimum shipboard manpower 
requirements and reflected in a SMD changed.  The Navy Standard 
Workweek Afloat increased from 67 to 70 productive hours per Sailor, 
which reduced shipboard manning by up to 4 percent.  The revised 
equation also reduced the time allotted for Sailors to conduct preventive 
maintenance actions and reduced the productivity allowance applied for 
environmental fatigue and interruptions. (Balisle, 2010, p. 12) 
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This decrease in billets would appear to have generated at least two unintended 
consequences: increased the workload, thereby increasing the probability of 
insufficient/inaccurate maintenance documentation 
The reduction in billets apparently reduces the time and personnel neeed to 
conduct on-the-job training.  In 1999, external command inspections were eliminated and 
self assessment policies were implemented (Balisle, 2010, p. 13).  Prior to this change, 
maintenance assist visits and inspections were available ships.  “These inspections and 
assist visits brought system experts onboard and provided over-the-shoulder training to 
the crews.  By 2001 there were only 35 of these inspections and assist visits available to 
the ships, drastically reducing the professional development and hands-on training of our 
Sailors” (Balisle, 2010, p. 13). 
b. Recommendation:  NAVSEA and NAVMAC co-author a study to determine 
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AVERAGE ELECTRICAL PM:CM RATIO FOR DDG'S
Elec San Elec Dep
Red line represents the1:1 PM:CM ratio for mechanical corrective maintenance.  
Figure 3.  Electrical Systems PM:CM ratio based on our data 





















I II II A PT 1 II A PT 2 II A PT 3
AVERAGE MECHANICAL PM:CM RATIO FOR DDG'S
Mech San Mech Dep
Red line represents the1:. 5 PM:CM ratio for mechanical corrective maintenance.  
Figure 4.  Mechanical Systems PM:CM ratio based on our data 
2. Secondary Research Question 
How does maintenance workload affect Manpower requirements? 
a.  Conclusion: The effect to SMD requirements for the EA work center when 
corrective maintenance hours from OARS are used in the place of the hours that are 
allotted in the original SMD are shown in Table 4.  When corrective maintenance 
reported to OARS is used, the result increases requirements across all five flights of 
DDGs for the EA work center. 

















Billets 8 8 8 8 8
EA Division Authorized 
Billets 8 8 8 8 8
Operational Manning 
(watchstanding) hrs/week 224 224 224 224 224
Operational Manning 
(watchstanding) hrs/week 224 224 224 224 224
Planned Maintenance 
hrs/week 110.7 33.7 33.7 38.6 85
Planned Maintenance 
hrs/week 110.7 33.7 33.7 38.6 85
Corrective Maintenance 
hrs/week 69.7 38.8 38.8 31.5 63.7
Corrective Maintenance 
hrs/week 223.6 64.9 276.6 373.9 106.4
Own Unit Support 
hrs/week 107.6 101 101 101 100.9
Own Unit Support 
hrs/week 107.6 101 101 101 100.9
Facilities Maintenance 
hrs/week 50.6 91.9 99.4 99.5 88.5
Facilities Maintenance 
hrs/week 50.6 91.9 99.4 99.5 88.5
Productivity Allowance 
hrs/week 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.6 5.1
Productivity Allowance 
hrs/week 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.6 5.1
Service Diversion 
Allowance 32 32 32 32 32
Service Diversion 
Allowance 32 32 32 32 32
Training 56 56 56 56 56 Training 56 56 56 56 56
Total Division Hrs 
hrs/week 655.2 582.0 589.7 587.2 655.2
Total Division Hrs 
hrs/week 809.1 608.1 827.5 929.6 697.9
Hrs Per Billet 81.9 72.8 73.7 73.4 81.9 Hrs Per Billet 101.1 76.0 103.4 116.2 87.2
EA Division Authorized 
Billets 8 8 8 8 8
EA Division Authorized 
Billets 12 9 12 13 10
SMD INFORMATION SMD INFORMATION
 
Table 4.   Effects of SMD Requirements (EA Work Center) 
The effect to SMD requirements for the CF work center when corrective 
maintenance hours from OARS are used in the place of the hours that are allotted in the 
original SMD as shown in Table 5.  For the CF work center the use of OARS corrective 
maintenance data generated an increase in requirements in four of the five flights of 

















Billets 18 19 19 19 19
CF Division Authorized 
Billets 18 19 19 19 19
Operational Manning 
(watchstanding) hrs/week 840 840 840 840 840
Operational Manning 
(watchstanding) hrs/week 840 840 840 840 840
Planned Maintenance 
hrs/week 19.1 44.7 44.8 51 53.3
Planned Maintenance 
hrs/week 19.1 44.7 44.8 51 53.3
Corrective Maintenance 
hrs/week 11.5 47.5 47.5 58.4 64.9
Corrective Maintenance 
hrs/week 189.9 230.9 121.4 445.3 144.4
Own Unit Support 
hrs/week 120 108.1 108.1 108.1 108.1
Own Unit Support 
hrs/week 120 108.1 108.1 108.1 108.1
Facilities Maintenance 
hrs/week 85.5 4.7 15.6 15.5 15.6
Facilities Maintenance 
hrs/week 85.5 4.7 15.6 15.5 15.6
Productivity Allowance 
hrs/week 4.3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8
Productivity Allowance 
hrs/week 4.3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8
Service Diversion 
Allowance 76 76 76 76 76
Service Diversion 
Allowance 76 76 76 76 76
Training 133 133 133 133 133 Training 133 133 133 133 133
Total Division Hrs 
hrs/week 1289.4 1257.2 1268.4 1285.6 1294.7
Total Division Hrs 
hrs/week 1467.8 1440.56 1342.29 1672.47 1374.19
Hrs Per Billet 71.6 66.2 66.8 67.7 68.1 Hrs Per Billet 81.5 75.8 70.6 88.0 72.3
CF Division Authorized 
Billets 18 19 19 19 19
CF Division Authorized 
Billets 21 21 19 24 20
SMD INFORMATION SMD INFORMATION
 
Table 5.   Effects of SMD Requirements (CF Work Center) 
Table 6 examines how SMD requirements would differ in the EA work center if 
the SMD generated requirements based on the guidance in OPNAVINST 1000.16K.  The 
effect to requirements in the EA work center is an increase of 4–8 (50–100 percent) 

















Billets 8 8 8 8 8
EA Division Authorized 
Billets 8 8 8 8 8
Operational Manning 
(watchstanding) hrs/week 224 224 224 224 224
Operational Manning 
(watchstanding)1  
hrs/week 448 448 448 448 448
Planned Maintenance 
hrs/week 110.7 33.7 33.7 38.6 85
Planned Maintenance2 
hrs/week 14.7 13.6 19.8 19.8 19.8
Corrective Maintenance 
hrs/week 69.7 38.8 38.8 31.5 63.7
Corrective Maintenance3 
hrs/week 223.6 64.9 276.6 373.9 106.4
Own Unit Support 
hrs/week 107.6 101 101 101 100.9
Own Unit Support 
hrs/week 107.6 101.0 101.0 101.0 100.9
Facilities Maintenance 
hrs/week 50.6 91.9 99.4 99.5 88.5
Facilities Maintenance 
hrs/week 50.6 91.9 99.4 99.5 88.5
Productivity Allowance 
hrs/week 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.6 5.1
Productivity Allowance4 
hrs/week 7.6 5.2 9.5 11.5 5.9
Service Diversion 
Allowance 32 32 32 32 32
Service Diversion 
Allowance1 32 32 32 32 32
Training 56 56 56 56 56 Training1 56 56 56 56 56
Total Division Hrs 
hrs/week 655.2 582.0 589.7 587.2 655.2
Total Division Hrs5 
hrs/week 940.1 812.6 1042.3 1141.7 857.5
Hrs Per Billet 81.9 72.8 73.7 73.4 81.9 Hrs Per Billet1 117.5 101.6 130.3 142.7 107.2
EA Division Authorized 
Billets 8 8 8 8 8
EA Division Authorized 










Table 6.   SMD Comparison (EA Work Center) 
Table 7 examines how SMD requirements would differ in the CF work center if 
the SMD generated requirements based on the guidance in OPNAVINST 1000.16K.  The 
effect to requirements in the EA work center is an increase of 5–9 (33–47 percent) 

















Billets 18 19 19 19 19
EA Division Authorized 
Billets 18 19 19 19 19
Operational Manning 
(watchstanding) hrs/week 840 840 840 840 840
Operational Manning 
(watchstanding)1  
hrs/week 1008 1064 1064 1064 1064
Planned Maintenance 
hrs/week 19.1 44.7 44.8 51 53.3
Planned Maintenance2 
hrs/week 70.4 75.3 84.8 85.2 94.4
Corrective Maintenance 
hrs/week 11.5 47.5 47.5 58.4 64.9
Corrective Maintenance3 
hrs/week 189.9 230.9 121.4 445.3 144.4
Own Unit Support 
hrs/week 120 108.1 108.1 108.1 108.1
Own Unit Support 
hrs/week 120.0 108.1 108.1 108.1 108.1
Facilities Maintenance 
hrs/week 85.5 4.7 15.6 15.5 15.6
Facilities Maintenance 
hrs/week 85.5 4.7 15.6 15.5 15.6
Productivity Allowance 
hrs/week 4.3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8
Productivity Allowance4 
hrs/week 23.7 20.6 14.7 34.1 16.1
Service Diversion 
Allowance 76 76 76 76 76
Service Diversion 
Allowance1 76 76 76 76 76
Training 133 133 133 133 133 Training1 133 133 133 133 133
Total Division Hrs 
hrs/week 1289.4 1257.2 1268.4 1285.6 1294.7
Total Division Hrs5 
hrs/week 1706.6 1712.6 1617.5 1961.2 1651.5
Hrs Per Billet 71.6 66.2 66.8 67.7 68.1 Hrs Per Billet1 94.8 90.1 85.1 103.2 86.9
CF Division Authorized 
Billets 18 19 19 19 19
CF Division Authorized 










Table 7.   SMD Comparison (CF Work Center) 
In both the EA and CF work centers, requirements increased when the OARS CM 
data was used to generate requirements.  The OPNAVINST 1000.16K states that 
NAVMAC may use validated corrective maintenance workload to create the SMDs.  In 
both of our examples, if workload would have been used, it would have resulted in 
increased requirements to the EA and CF work centers. 
b. Recommendations: 
• We recommend that further comparisons be completed across all divisions 
on other ships in this class to validate the results of this study. 
• Commanding Officers and Maintenance and Material Management 
System Coordinators (3MC) need to validate OARS data once compiled in 
final form to NAVMAC. 
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APPENDIX A.  EA WORK CENTER CORRECTIVE 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX B.  CF WORK CENTER CORRECTIVE 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX C.  EA WORK CENTER CORRECTIVE 





































































APPENDIX D.  CF WORK CENTER CORRECTIVE 
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